In this paper, we describe and evaluate a secure data exchange protocol based on the Zigbee specification and built on top of 802.15.4 beacon enabled link layer. This protocol includes a key exchange mechanism and addition of Message Authenication Code to each packet. We have simulated key exchange protocol over physical and data link layers in IEEE 802.15.4 beacon enabled cluster. Since key distribution protocol requires downlink data transmissions which have complex implementation, its communication cost is high. Our results indicate that even for small cluster size, frequent key exchanges impose a serious performance burden on the data traffic. Therefore, the period for key exchanges (i.e. the degree of security protection) has to be traded for the cluster size and throughput.
Introduction
The need for low-cost, low-power and short-range communication is the main reason of introducing IEEE 802.15.4 Low Rate Wireless Personal Area Network (LR-WPAN) standard (Std, 2003) . The 802.15.4 specification outlines some basic security services at the data link layer that can be combined with advanced techniques at the upper layers to implement a comprehensive security solution. For example, the recent ZigBee specification (Alliance, 2004) implements a number of protocols-including security-related ones-that can be deployed in an 802.15.4 network. Given that the 802.15.4 devices are typically severely constrained in terms of their communication and computational resources, the implementation of such solutions is likely to impose a significant performance overhead. In this paper, we investigate those performance implications of some security solutions, namely, the Symmetric-Key Key Establishment (SKKE) as specified in Alliance (2004) , in the context of a single 802.15.4 sensor cluster operating in beacon enabled, slotted CSMA-CA mode. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study specifically devoted to the analysis of the SKKE security suite and its performance. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the operation of 802.15.4-compliant networks with star topology in the beacon enabled, slotted CSMA-CA mode followed by a review of basic security mechanisms provided for by the standard. In Section 3, we describe key management approach proposed by the ZigBee Alliance. We describe the SKKE mechanism adapted to beacon enabled 802.15.4 cluster in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss integration of SKKE protocol with the medium access control protocol of IEEE 802.15.4. Section 6 presents the results of our analysis, while Section 7 concludes this paper work.
An overview of 802.15.4 specification
In an IEEE 802.15.4-compliant Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN), a central controller device (commonly referred to as the PAN coordinator) builds a WPAN with other devices within a small physical space known as the personal operating space. The standard allows two topologies: the peer-to-peer topology in which nodes can directly communicate with one another and star topology in which all communications, even those between the devices themselves, must go through the PAN coordinator. While the former topology may appear better suited to sensing tasks, it was recently shown that such networks with identical devices are not optimal in terms of power consumption. Namely, nodes close to the network sink die much earlier than those farther away, since their batteries will be exhausted due to excessive packet relaying (Mhatre et al., 2005) . As a result, the network will cease to function, even though many nodes still have sufficient power. The concept of power heterogeneity, enhanced with link heterogeneity, was further considered in Yarvis et al. (2005) , where it was shown that the inclusion of a modest number of nodes with higher power can provide a substantial increase of the network lifetime. On account of this, we consider only clusters using the latter, star topology in this work.
The 802.15.4 networks with star topology operate in beacon enabled mode where channel time is divided into superframes bounded by beacon transmissions from the PAN coordinator (Std, 2003) . All communications in the cluster take place during the active portion of the superframe; the (optional) inactive portion may be used to switch to conserve power by switching devices to a low power mode.
The active portion of each superframe is divided into equally sized slots which are further subdivided into backoff periods. Channel access is regulated through the CSMA-CA mechanism (Std, 2003) . Since both packet transmissions and Clear Channel Access (CCA) checks must be synchronised to the boundaries of backoff periods, this mechanism is designated as slotted CSMA-CA. The bandwidth offered by IEEE 802.15.4 standard is low, since the standard allows the PAN to use either one of three frequency bands: 868-868.6 MHz, 902-928 MHz and 2400-2483.5 MHz with raw data rates of 20, 40 kbps and 250 kbps, respectively. Basic backoff period under 250 kbps raw rate has the length of 10 bytes. Maximum packet size including headers from the physical and medium access control protocol layer is 127 bytes. The standard prescribes that the minimum MAC and physical header size is 15 bytes.
Data transfers in the downlink direction, from the coordinator to a node, must first be announced by the coordinator. In this case, the beacon frame will contain the list of nodes that have pending downlink packets, as shown in Figure 1(a) . When the node learns there is a data packet to be received, it transmits a request. The coordinator acknowledges the successful reception of the request by transmitting an acknowledgement. After receiving the acknowledgement, the node listens for the actual data packet for the period of aMaxFrameResponseTime, during which the coordinator must send the data frame. The 802.15.4 standard specifies several security suites which consist of a 'set of operations to perform on MAC frames that provide security services' (Std, 2003) . Specified security services include the following:
• Any device can maintain an Access Control List (ACL) -a list of trusted devices from which the device wishes to receive data; this mechanism is intended to filter out unauthorised communications.
• Data encryption service helps a device encrypt a MAC frame payload using the key shared between two peers or among a group of peers. If the key is to be shared between two peers, it is stored with each entry in the ACL list; otherwise, the key is stored as the default key (the MAC layer provides the symmetric encryption security systems using application-provided key or keys). Thus, the device can make sure that the data cannot be read by devices that do not possess the corresponding key. However, device addresses are always transmitted in the clear (i.e. unencrypted), which makes attacks that rely on device identity somewhat easier to launch.
• Frame integrity service ensures that a frame cannot be modified by a receiver device that does not share a key with the sender, by appending a Message Integrity Code (MIC) generated from blocks of encrypted message text.
• Finally, sequential freshness uses the frame counter and key sequence counter to ensure the freshness of the incoming frame and guard against replay attacks.
The services listed above are typically implemented in hardware for performance reasons, and their use is optional. A device can choose to operate unsecured mode, secured mode and ACL mode. In unsecure mode, none of the services mentioned above are available. In secured mode, the device may use one of the security suites supported by the standard (Std, 2003) , all of which use the data encryption service explained above. A device operating in ACL mode can maintain a list of trusted devices from which it expects to receive packets, but the only security service available is access control service which enables the receiver to filter received frames according to the source address listed in the frame. As no encryption is used, it is not possible to authenticate the true source of the data packet or to ascertain that the packet payload has not been modified in any way. While these services are useful, they are by no means sufficient. In particular, procedures for key management, device authentication and freshness protection are not specified by the 802.15.4 standard. Hence, they must be implemented by the applications or perhaps by another layer of network protocols running on top of 802.15.4 itself.
IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides physical and link layer solutions for WPANs. It also provides well-known and well-understood cryptographic techniques (Alliance, 2004; Stallings, 2003) by supporting authentication, message integrity, confidentiality and freshness check for preventing replay attacks. Application of such security mechanisms comes at a cost that include processing overhead, memory overhead, power consumption and resulting low bandwidth (Sastry and Wagner, 2004) . In this paper, we will mainly focus on measuring the processing and communication overhead of secure IEEE 802.15.4 networks.
An application implemented using IEEE 802.15.4 has choice of different security suites, these suites control the type of security protection by setting appropriate control parameters in the link layer security suite stack. These security suites provide the range of security options starting from no security to providing encryption and authentication alone and also both together on the communicating traffic. In IEEE 802.15.4 compliant network, if privacy of data is the only desired requirement, then it is achieved by employing AES encryption in counter(CTR) mode of operation whereas if only authentication is desired, it is achieved by appending a Message Authentication Code (MAC) by employing Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode of authentication. In applications where both encryption and authentication are desired, IEEE 802.15.4 compliant network will employ counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) (Whiting et al., 2003) mode of operation of AES with optional block sizes of 32, 64 and 128 bits. CCM mode is a mode of operation for cryptographic block ciphers. It is an authenticated encryption algorithm designed to provide both authentication and privacy. CCM mode combines the well-known counter mode of encryption with the well-known CBC-MAC mode of authentication. In IEEE 802.15.4 compliant network, CCM mode uses counter mode by first applying integrity protection both on message header and data payload and then encrypting the data payload and MAC using AES. At the receiver end; the receiver gets the packet; applies decryption using parameters based on sender's address from its ACL. The insight of combining both methods of encryption and authentication is that the same encryption key can be used for both, provided that the counter values used in the encryption do not collide with initialisation vector used in authentication.
A cryptographic MAC is used to authenticate messages. While longer MAC sizes lead to improved resiliency of the code (Bellare et al., 2000) , they also increase the packet size and thus take up bandwidth in the network. Applications that require continuous data flow will be affected more than those that are event-driven, but in either case, an optimum balance between security requirements and network throughput must be found.
For the current work, we will consider the security suite where both encryption and authentication are desired in a IEEE 802.15.4 compliant network, hence employing Counter with CCM (Whiting et al., 2003) mode of AES which provides both encryption and data integrity while a MAC size of 128 bits (16 bytes) is used. From the aspect of IEEE 802.15.4 PAN running with 250 kbps of raw data rate, this MAC size is a significant overhead.
Key managament protocols for ZigBee Alliance
Sound security policy regarding transparent key updates is fundamental component of sound security practice. Key management is the set of techniques and procedures supporting the establishment and maintenance of keying relations between authorised parties. Key management encompasses techniques and procedures supporting: 1 initialisation of nodes within some security domain 2 generation, distribution and instalation of keying material 3 controlling the use of keying material 4 update, revocation and destruction of keying material
The time period over which encryption/MAC keys are valid for use is an important performance characteristic of the network. If the key lifetime is long, then various kinds of cryptanalysis attacks can be conducted and if the key is compromised, network traffic from particular node will be exposed for a long time.
One viable alternative for this task is the ZigBee protocol suite (Alliance, 2004) developed by the ZigBee Alliance, an industry consortium working on developing network and Application Programming Interfaces (API) for wireless ad hoc and sensor networks. The ZigBee APIs include security extensions at different networking layers, using both symmetric and asymmetric key exchange protocols. Asymmetric key exchange protocols, which mainly rely on public key cryptography, are computationally intensive and their application in wireless sensor networks is only possible with devices that are resource rich in computation and power and connected through high bandwidth links. Therefore, protocols which rely on symmetric key exchange are to be preferred in this context.
The application support sublayer of the ZigBee specification defines the mechanism by which a ZigBee device may derive a shared secret key (link Key) with another ZigBee device; this mechanism is known as the SKKE protocol. Key establishment involves two entities, an initiator device and a responder device, and should be prefaced by a trust provisioning step in which trust information (a master key) provides a starting point for establishing a link key. The master key may be preinstalled during manufacturing, may be installed by a trust centre, or may be based on user-entered data (PIN, password). The details of this procedure are beyond the scope of this paper. In the discussions that follow, we assume that all the devices, including the PAN coordinator, preinstalled master keys and focus on link Key establishment and its performance implications.
Symmetric-key key establishment protocol
Before we describe the protocol itself, let us remind the reader that block ciphers can be used to construct one-way hash functions in an efficient manner (Stallings, 2003) . The 802.15.4 specification supports the AES block cipher in its basic form, while the ZigBee specification suggests the use of a modified AES algorithm with a block size of 128 bits (Menezes et al., 1997) as the cryptographic hash function. The hash function of a data block d will be denoted as H (d). Furthermore, keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), is a MAC calculated using a cryptographic hash function in conjunction with a secret key. The ZigBee specification suggests the use of the keyed-HMAC originally proposed in FIP (2002):
||MacData)
where ipad and opad are hexadecimal constants. In this paper, we will follow the notation introduced in Alliance (2004) and present the last equation in the equivalent form MacTag = MAC MacKey MacData. With this notation, we can proceed to describe the SKKE protocol in more detail; Figure 2 shows the individual steps and message exchanges. 
Exchange of ephemeral data
The protocol begins with the exchange of ephemeral data. The initiator device U , (which is PAN coordinator in the case of beacon enabled slotted IEEE 802.15.4 cluster) will generate the challenge QEU, which is a statistically unique and unpredictable bit string of length challengelen. This string is generated by either using a random or pseudorandom string from a challenge domain D. The challenge domain D defines the minimum and maximum length of the challenge, D = (minchallengeLen, maxchallengeLen). Upon receiving the challenge QEU, the responder device (which is the ordinary sensing node in the cluster) validates that the bit-length of QEU satisfies the condition Challengelen ∈ [minchallengelen, maxchallengelen] .
Once the validation is successful, the responder device will also generate its own, different challenge QEV and send it to the initiator device U . Once received, this challenge is validated in the same manner.
Generation of shared secret
Upon successful validation of challenges, both devices generate a shared secret based on unique identifiers (i.e. distinguished names for each parties involved), symmetric master keys and both local and received challenge strings.
1 Each device generates a MACData value by appending their respective identifiers and validated challenges together:
where the symbol || denotes concatenation.
2 Each device calculates the MACTag (i.e. the keyed hash) for MACData using the master key Mkey:
Note that both devices should obtain the same shared secret Z = MACTag at this time.
Derivation of link key
After generation of shared secret, each device generates two cryptgraphic hashes (note that these are not keyed hashes) of the shared secret, using the procedure described in ANS (2001):
where x 16 denotes the hexadecimal value of the number x. The second value, Hash 2 , will be link key among two devices, while the first value, Hash 1 , will be used in the next step of the protocol to confirm that both parties have reached the same link key: 
Integration of security mechanisms with MAC
In this section, we describe the communications between the ordinary nodes and PAN coordinator which occur as result from the link key exchange. We assume that devices are attached to the cluster and the formation of the piconet is finalised. Also, we assume the master keys are established, so that there is no threat of eavesdropping during exchange of master keys. The next step is generating link keys between each device and PAN coordinator. For the exchange of link keys, we will follow SKKE protocol as discussed in Section 4. Data encryption is provided by link key which is a key shared between two peers (typically stored in an individual ACL entry). The maximum size of the key is 128 bits (16 bytes) which produces 16 bytes of message authenication code which is considerable addition to the payload since that maximum packet size inlcuding all the headers cannot exceed 127 bytes. In this standard, message authenication code may be provided on beacon payloads, command payloads and data payloads. In this work, for the sake of simplicity, we apply message authenication code on data packets only.
The process of key generation starts by PAN coordinator's advertisement for the first phase of key generation packets. Depending on which stage of generation we are in, the corresponding SKKE type of data packet (ranging from 1 to 4) will be processed (e.g. the first data packet has the type of SKKE-1 and so on). According to the standard specification, at the most seven devices can be advertised in each beacon. Therefore, the PAN coordinator will advertise seven devices in each beacon. According to the standard, each device listens to each beacon, and if its ID is being advertised, the device will send a request packet. Request packet is transmitted in CSMA-CA mode and can collide with other packets. If it is received successfully by the PAN coordinator, it will be acknowledged, and downlink packet transmission carrying the SKKE protocol data will follow in the downlink transmission. However, there are three obstacles which IEEE 802.15.4 medium access control makes to the efficient link key exchange:
1 While PAN coordinator is conducting backoff procedure prior to downlink transmission, it is not receiving other request packets. Therefore, even if ordinary node x has transmitted the request packet without the collision, PAN coordinator will not acknowledge it and it has to be repeated.
2 When request packet is successfully received, PAN coordinator has only 61 backoff periods to transmit the data packet. If this value is exceeded due to congestion on the medium, the whole advertisment and request process has to be repeated.
3 Downlink transmission can collide with some other request or data packets. In this case, acknowledgement will not be sent, and PAN coordinator has to continue advertising node's address until node repeats request packet and correctly receives the downlink packet.
In our model, key exchange packets have non-preemptive priority over data packets. If the node has started backoff process for data packet and it hears its ID in the beacon, it will finish the current packet transmission before sending the request packet. However, if data packet arrives at the device's buffer while the key exchange is going on, its trasnmission will be postponed until the device receives the new link key. Looking at the other end which is the PAN coordinator, things are a little more complex because the PAN coordinator is responsible to receive the packets and pass them to the destination. Therefore, after receiving a packet and right before entering them to the downlink queues, the packets should be checked for key. No packets will be sent to the specific destination until the corresponding link key is exchanged between PAN coordinator and the node (i.e upon receiving the last SKKE type packet). From this point on, regular data packets will be immediately sent to the destination.
The technique under consideration for key establishment relies on the AES block cipher supported by IEEE 802.15.4, also, all the cryptographic hashing and MAC calculation relied on AES block cipher. Hence, the cost incured by applying AES on these techniques plays the pivotal role in the overall computation cost of all security techniques. In our model, we inlcude the execution delays of AES encryption and decryption for a 128-bit plain text with a 128-bit key. We include the values measured by Duh and Chan (2006) implementing AES on MICA2 nodes by Crossbrow Techonology Inc. In this work, we do not consider encryption of the packet data, but its addition to our model is straightforward (Table 1) . 
Link key update
Depending on the severity of the threat environment, it is possible that a node or link key is compromised by an adversary and can send false data to the PAN coordinator. Key update provides an automated mechanism for restricting the amount of data which may be exposed when a link key is compromised. However, key updates protocol depends on the key update overheads and threat environment under which network is working. Hence, controlling the life time of keys and determination of how the key update occurs is a challenging task in any network. Approaches for key updates in general wireless networks mainly target network that have group key structures and have high communication bandwidth (Wang and Bhargava, 2005; Zhang et al., 2003) . For resource scarce IEEE 802.15.4 networks, these key updates will effect the performance adversely.
In this work, we assume that PAN coordinator maintains a counter for each node that keeps track of the number of packets exchanged under the same key (Figure 2 ). When the threshold value of the counter is reached for any device, the PAN coordinator will initiate the key exchange with all the devices in the cluster. During the key exchange, all devices will temporarily stop the data transmission and resume it when they acknowledge the new key. An alternative approach will be to use the single counter for all the devices. However, this approach may open the security hole for denial of service attack by single corrupted device.
Performance analysis
We have implemented the physical, data link and security layer of an IEEE 802.15.4 cluster operating in beacon enabled, slotted CSMA-CA mode, using the object-oriented Petri net simulation engine Artifex by RSoft Design, Inc. (2003) . We have assumed that the cluster operates in the ISM band at 2.4 GHz with raw data rate 250 kbps, and with SO = 0, BO = 0 and that other medium access control parameters follow default values from the standard (Std, 2003) .
The packet size without security overheads includes all physical layer and medium access control layer headers, and it is set to 30 bytes that is, to three backoff periods. When packet signature (message authenication code) of 16 bytes is added, the total packet size had to be rounded to 5 backoff periods (the largest packet size could be set to 13 backoff periods). The time for generating packet signature is shown in 1.
Key distribution is triggered when any of the devices sends T = 10 packets to the coordinator. When the coordinator announces key exchange in the beacon, all nodes have to temporarily stop uplink data transmissions until they receive new key initialisation values from the coordinator in the downlink packets. Due to complex downlink data-link transmission algorithm, we expected that key exchanges will adversely affect the regular sensing traffic.
In order to evaluate the impact of key exchange load on ordinary traffic, we have conducted two sets of simulation experiments in IEEE 802.15.4 beacon enabled cluster. First set of experiments demonstrates development of cluster performance parameters in time, for the case of: 1 7 security enabled devices which report sensed data to the PAN coordinator 2 14 security enabled devices which report sensed data to the PAN coordinator 3 7 security enabled devices which report sensed data to the PAN coordinator and seven devices which only report sensed data to the PAN coordinator without any security protection.
In order to verify our hypothesis, we monitored cluster performance in time snapshots of δt = 250 backoff periods. Second set of experiments present average values of performance parameters for the clusters with security protection, without security protection and combination of half nodes with and half nodes without security protection. In all experiments, ordinary node has buffer capacity for three packets. In experiments shown in Figures 3-5 , packet arrival per device followed the Poisson process with average rate of 90.5 packets per minute. In experiments shown in Figures 6-8, packet arrival rate followed the Poisson process, but average arrival rate was varied.
Performance over time for seven devices
In the first experiment, the cluster under consideration contains seven devices only, and therefore it was possible to advertise the keys for devices in a single beacon. All devices temporarily stopped their data transmission during the key exchange. The behaviour of the cluster over time is presented in Figure 3 Figure 3 shows number of backoff periods spent in key exchange. We notice that average cost of key exchange is slightly below 2000 backoff periods, which gives 250-270 backoff periods per device. Knowing that the key exchange involves a total of two downlink (uplink request + downlink data) transmissions and three uplink transmissions, we conclude that one CSMA-CA access takes approximately 40 backoff periods. Given the backoff window sizes of (8, 16, 32, 32, 32) , we conclude that transmission commences in average after third backoff attempt which indicates moderate to large activity over the medium.
The blocking probability at individual sensor node buffer over the snapshot periods is shown in Figure 3(b) . Due to large periods when device transmission is prevented during key exchange (well over 1500 backoff periods), the blocking probability skyrockets to values between 0.7 and 1. When the key exchange is finished, normal data communications resume. As a result, the blocking probability drops abruptly to values around 0.3 and slowly declines further as the backlogged packets clear.
Figure 3(c) shows the throughput values measured during snapshot intervals of 250 backoff periods. The throughput of data packets is shown in white, while the throughput of key-exchange packets is shown in black. According to the throughput results reported in Mišić et al. (2006) , the observed network regime without key exchange is slightly below the saturation condition (in saturation condition, all data transmissions end up in collisons). 
Performance over time for 14 devices
With 14 devices, two successive beacon frames are needed to advertise all the keys. As in the previous scenario, when node learns that its key has been advertised in the beacon, it finishes current transmission (if any) and transmits request packet to the PAN coordinator. Due to larger number of nodes, it will happen that some nodes receive new keys and resume transmissions while some are trying to get the keys. Depending on the key update interval, some devices may spend unnacceptably long periods executing the key exchange and this will affect the reliability of the sensing application. As could be expected, the amount of contention over the medium increases dramatically during the key exchange procedures as shown in Figure 4 . If we compare the Figures 4(a) and 3(a), we observe that cost of key exchange did not only double, but increases drastically. This is due to the problems of downlink transmissions which we mentioned in Section 5.
Between the key exchanges, we observe smooth activity of uplink transmissions, since pure uplink transmissions coming from 14 devices present moderate load to the cluster. However, Figure 4 (c) also reveals that congestion coming from key exchange can last several thousand backoff periods and data communication is cut off during that time. 
Performance over time for seven security enabled devices and seven devices without the security protection
In the third scenario, we included seven nodes without security features and seven devices with regular key exchanges. The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 5 . Although the number of devices is the same as in the previous experiments, the blocking probability is much lower and throughput is higher. This confirms our observation that frequent key exchanges present a serious loading of the network, which could ultimately present a threat to the ongoing traffic (if there was any). 
Average values of performance parameters with variable cluster size and packet arrival rate
In this section, we considered the impact of the increase of packet size due to addition of MAC, increased processing time needed for encryption in AES with CBC-MAC, and key exchange between the nodes over various packet arrival rates and cluster sizes. Figure 6 presents throughput, blocking probability at the node's buffer, average key cost and transmission success probability (probability of no packet collision) when all security overhead is included. Results were taken for varying number of nodes and varying packet arrrival rate per node. Figure 7 presents the same parameters (except the key exchange cost since it does not exist) when no security measures are deployed in the network. We observe that without security measures, blocking probability is equal to zero that is, that network works without losses. Finally, Figure 8 shows the performance when half of the devices are security-enabled and half are not. By comparing these results with the situation when all the devices are security enabled, we see that throughput almost doubles as well as the transmission success probability. This draws the conclusion that key frequent exchanges even when the ordinary traffic from the node is suppressed present a serious burden to the network. Also, we draw the conclusion that presence of key exchanges with relatively short exchange period (i.e. after 10 packets transmitted by the device), seriously affects the throughput in cluster with more than 10 devices. Figure 7 Throughput, blocking probability and success probability as the function of number of devices and packet arrival rate (per minute) without any security overhead: (a) throughput; (b) blocking probability and (c) success probability 
Conclusion
In this work, we have evaluated the impact of key exchange protocol, encryption delay and packet length increase due to MAC on the performance of IEEE 802.15.4 beacon enabled cluster. We have considered small, medium cluster size and cluster with mixture of traffic with security measures and background traffic without security measures. We have integrated key exchange protocol over physical and data link layers in IEEE 802.15.4 beacon enabled cluster. Since key distribution protocol requires downlink data transmissions which have complex implementation, its communication cost is high. The results indicate that even for small cluster size, frequent key exchanges impose a serious performance burden on the data traffic. Therefore, the period for key exchanges (i.e. the degree of security protection) has to be traded for the cluster size and throughput.
